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How Analysts Process Information: 
Technical and Financial Disclosures in the Microprocessor Industry 
  
Abstract 
Following Bradshaw (2009, 2011), this paper examines how analysts process information, particularly in 
an information environment characterised by multiple and potentially complementary information 
sources. The setting is the microprocessor industry, one in which technical information is particularly 
significant and complex to digest. Based on 3,837 analyst earnings-forecast revisions, issued by 134 
analysts, we examine quantitatively the speed, magnitude, and information content of the reactions of 
individual analysts and sub-groups of analysts to both periodic and timely technical disclosures, and as a 
complement to periodic financial disclosure. We find that analysts are much slower to react to timely 
technical disclosures than they are to periodic financial disclosures. We find also that technical and 
financial disclosures complement each other.  Further, we find that there is a ‘hierarchy’ of analysts in 
this particular industry, as evidenced through the strength of reaction to timely technical disclosures.  
Finally, we find that lower speed in reacting to timely technical disclosures and a higher intensity in the 
use of timely technical disclosure (in conjunction with periodic financial disclosure) result in greater 
accuracy, and that more experienced analysts tend to be less accurate. We suggest that the findings may 
have implications for other industries such as Bio-Tech Pharma. 
 




Accounting researchers have paid relatively little attention to the ‘how’ of 
information processing (Bradshaw, 2009, 2011).  This issue is particularly important in 
information environments with multiple and potentially complementary components, 
and where the digesting of technical information is especially significant.  We start from 
the intuition that multiple information sources or signals may complement rather than 
substitute for each other (Francis et al. 2002).  Amir and Lev (1996) studied such 
 
 Supplemental materials are available in an online Appendix. 
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complementary relations in the wireless communication industry, while Gietzmann and 
Ireland (2005) have argued more recently that companies communicate via multiple 
‘message spaces’. A large body of prior research has shown the importance of non-
financial information in explaining future financial performance, as well as analyst 
behaviour.1  Consistent with this literature, we seek in this paper to open up the ‘black 
box’ of information processing by analysts. 
As Bradshaw (2009, 2011) has suggested, the study of information processing is 
not easily accessed by conventional multi-firm archival studies.  Accordingly, we select 
a single industry (microprocessor), and one in which the digesting of technical 
information is especially significant (Schaller, 2004; Zuckerman, 2004).  This is 
consistent with calls for clinical studies (Jensen et al., 1989), appeals to alternative 
research methodologies (Bradshaw, 2009, 2011), and the growing body of accounting 
literature addressing by means of quantitative methods idiosyncratic situations or small 
numbers of cases.2   This allows us to generate a unique hand-gathered data source.  We 
focus on the dominant firm in the industry (Intel). Intel is one of the world's largest 
semiconductor chip makers when measured by sales revenue (Intel Corporation, 2013), 
it has long held a dominant position in microprocessor markets world-wide, and it 
exerts substantial influence on a wide range of complementary industries.3 
Following Gietzmann and Ireland (2005, p. 600), we use the term ‘timely’ 
disclosure to refer to those disclosures that may be more relevant to analysts than 
periodic disclosures, such as those contained in annual reports.  Consistent with this 
terminology and reasoning, we propose a tripartite distinction in this paper.  First, we 
refer to periodic financial disclosure, such as contained in annual and quarterly reports.  
Second, we refer to periodic technical disclosure, defined as those disclosures of 
information that is not normally contained in the financial reports, but which appears at 
routine intervals (this includes, in the case of microprocessors, operating metrics such as 
 
helpful comments.  We would also like to thank participants at the EFMA Conference (held at Bocconi 
University, June 2009). 
1 Baginski et al., 2004; Ball and Brown, 1968; Banker and Mashruwala, 2007; Barron et al., 1999; 
Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Bozzolan et al., 2009; Chandra et al., 1999; Clarkson et al., 1999; Espinosa 
et. al., 2009; Gu and Wang, 2005; Hussainey et. al., 2003; Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Rajgopal et al., 2003; 
Schleicher and Walker, 1999; Tellis and Johnson, 2007; Vanstraelen et. al., 2003; Xu et al., 2007.  See 
also Sievers et al. (2013) on the incremental value relevance of non-financial metrics in the context of 
venture capital-backed firms.  
2 Cahan et al., 2011; Ho et al., 2009; Hunton et al., 2010; Krishnan et al., 2011; and Wang et al., 2011.  Of 
these, Hunton et al. (2010) is the only one to study analysts, although the focus in that paper is on buy-
side rather than sell-side analysts. 
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chip cost, die size and die cost). Third, we refer to timely technical disclosure, defined 
as non-periodic disclosures contained in web-based press releases (pertaining to such as 
market creation, production processes and product design). By using hand gathered 
technical data contained in web-based press releases, alongside non-traditional technical 
data contained in the reports of technical analysts, we seek to differentiate the impact of 
these three components of the information environment in the microprocessor industry, 
and also to examine their interaction. We examine 3,837 analyst earnings-forecast 
revisions issued by 134 analysts employed by 83 brokerage and investment firms across 
the period 2000 to 2007. 
Our intuition is that, in knowledge-intensive industries, technical disclosures are 
unusually hard to digest, and this is likely to impact on information processing by 
analysts.  This is particularly the case with timely technical disclosures, such as those 
contained in web-based press releases.  We conduct both an association study and an 
event study, in order to investigate the information content of periodic technical 
disclosures and timely technical disclosures, and as a complement to periodic financial 
disclosure.  We conduct an event study in order to identify the speed and magnitude of 
individual analysts’ forecasts revisions made on the basis of such timely technical 
disclosure. We predict that there will be a significant lag in analysts responding to 
timely technical disclosures relative to periodic financial disclosures.4  We explore how 
analysts use such timely technical disclosures, jointly with periodic financial 
disclosures, in their earnings-forecast revisions for this industry. We distinguish 
between analysts employed at major brokerage and investment firms and analysts at 
other firms, in order to see whether there is a ‘hierarchy’ of analysts, with a relatively 
small number digesting and disseminating critical technical disclosures.  Finally, we 
examine whether analysts learn, and if so how.  To address this question we study how 
and to what extent the speed of reaction to timely technical disclosures, the intensity in 
the use of such disclosures, and the extent of analyst experience affects learning 
(accuracy).  
Section 2 presents the motivation for this study in light of the literature on 
analysts’ forecast revisions, which to date has focussed mainly on multi-firm samples.  
We consider also the literature pertaining to information processing, and learning by 
 
3 Also, since the early 1990s the firm has played a lead role in ensuring that innovation on the part of 
suppliers and complementors matches the ambitions and time-lines of leading chip makers, including 
Intel itself (Miller and O'Leary, 2007). 
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analysts.  Section 3 considers the methodological issues concerning the impact of timely 
versus periodic technical disclosures on earnings-forecast revisions and market prices. It 
also presents the sample and data. Section 4 describes the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Literature and motivation 
A large body of existing literature, based on multi-firm studies, has examined the 
informational efficiency of analysts’ forecast revisions,5 as well as so-called analyst 
informativeness.6  Specifically, Lys and Sohn (1990) have examined the information 
content of individual analysts’ forecast revisions, by testing the stock price reaction to a 
report, and the surprise in an individual analyst’s forecast. They concluded that 
analysts’ forecast revisions contain some, but not all of the information that was 
reflected in security prices prior to the forecast release. Frankel et al. (2006), by 
estimating the absolute stock price reaction on the dates that analysts release forecast 
revisions, find that analysts’ reports on average are significantly informative for the set 
of firms studied. 
A related body of literature has examined the effects of technical disclosures on 
analysts’ activity,7 and the use of non-financial indicators by analysts.8  Chandra et al. 
(1999), with reference to the semiconductor industry, do not show a significant 
association between analyst sales-forecast revisions and changes in the book-to-bill 
ratio (i.e. a forward-looking, industry-wide disclosure), but they provide evidence that 
analysts rely on this indicator to distinguish between permanent and transitory sales 
trends. Rajgopal et al. (2003) suggest that although analysts correctly incorporate order 
backlog information (i.e. a leading indicator) into their forecasts, the market fixates on 
the order backlog itself, without appreciating that forecasts already incorporate this 
information. Gu and Wang (2005) find a positive association between errors in analysts’ 
forecasts and non-financial information (diversity and innovation in technology). 
A further set of studies, which has produced mixed results to date, has examined 
whether analysts learn from their forecasting experience. Most of the evidence 
documents that forecast accuracy improves with firm-specific experience (Lys and Soo, 
 
4 While the microprocessor industry may be distinctive in this respect, it may also have similarities to the 
biopharmaceuticals industry, as examined by Espinosa et al. (2009). 
5 Cowen et al., 2006; Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Hong et al., 2000; Lin and McNichols, 1998. 
6 Frankel et al., 2006; Givoly and Lakonishok, 1979, 1984; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Lys and Sohn, 
1990. 
7 Barron et al., 1999; Bozzolan et al., 2009; Clarkson et al., 1999; Vanstraelen et al., 2003. 
1995; Mikhail et al., 1997, 2003).  However, Jacob et al. (1999) find that analysts do not 
learn from their forecasting experience, although situational differences (the differing 
demands and environment of brokerage houses) and dispositional differences (analysts’ 
innate ability) may explain differences in forecast accuracy.  
We suggest extending such enquiry, albeit in a somewhat different direction, by 
opening up the ‘black box’ of analyst information processing identified in differing 
ways by both Bradshaw (2009, 2011) and Zuckerman (2004).  We build on the findings 
of Francis et al. (2002), who examined whether the news in analyst reports pre-empts, 
or substitutes for, the news in earnings announcements.  They found instead that analyst 
reports can complement earnings announcements.9  We build also on the work of Amir 
and Lev (1996) regarding the complementary relations between financial and non-
financial information in the wireless communication industry, and Gietzmann and 
Ireland (2005) regarding timely disclosure, cost of capital, and accounting choice.  We 
combine these intuitions and findings with an adapted version of Bradshaw’s (2009) 
model of analysts’ decision processes (Figure 1).  He suggests that these processes 
should be viewed as a series of stages, and that the most interesting ones are the ‘black 
boxes’ that lead either to earnings forecasts or stock recommendations.  It is the first of 
these black boxes that we consider here.  
Figure 1: Simple schematic  of analyst information processing 
     



















Researchers within accounting, together with those in administrative science, have 
suggested that decision-makers often have limited information and limited ability to 
retain and process the information they have, as well as limited insight into their own 
decision processes and future preferences.10 We explore whether these limitations result 
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8 Chandra et al., 1999; Gu and Wang, 2005; Rajgopal et al, 2003.  
9 Consistent with Francis et al. (2002, p. 315), we use the word complement to capture the notion of a 
positive association between two information signals or sources, and not to indicate any particular 
structure or mechanism that may produce it. When we refer to ‘non-complements’, we mean the use of a 
single signal or information source. 
10  See March, 1987, 1988.  See also: Koonce and Mercer, 2005; Libby et al., 2002; Phillips and 
Zuckerman, 2001; Zuckerman, 2004. 
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in variation in information processing by analysts.  In particular, we examine whether 
technical and financial disclosures complement each other when used by analysts, and 
whether variations in the speed of reaction to periodic financial and timely technical 
disclosures, the intensity in the use of such disclosures, and the extent of analyst 
experience, are significant in a setting where the processing of technical information is 
unusually complex.  We seek to explore whether different types of information are 
processed differently and at differing speeds (including multiple information sources 
that may complement each other), and whether different types of analysts (more vs less 
experienced) vary in their ability to process such information. 
3. Method 
We employ a multiple-step procedure. As a preliminary step, reported in the 
online supplemental material, we use two methods to test whether analysts are on 
average informative. We examine the information content of analyst forecasts, as in Lys 
and Sohn (1990), and construct an index of analyst informativeness, as in Frankel et al. 
(2006). In short, prior results are confirmed in the Intel case: analyst forecasts are 
informative, analyst informativeness varies among analysts, analyst earnings forecasts 
reflect at least some of the information that was available to investors prior to the 
release of the new forecast, and the informativeness of analyst reports increases over 
time. In Section 3.2, which describes the first step of the main analysis, we examine 
whether periodic technical disclosure is useful as a complement to periodic financial 
disclosure in the production of analysts’ forecast revisions.  We use an association study 
at quarterly intervals to test whether individual analysts use both periodic financial and 
periodic technical disclosure when revising their estimates of future earnings. In section 
3.3, which describes the second step of our analysis, we employ an event study centered 
on the disclosure announcement date to analyse whether the information content of 
analyst earnings revisions depends on whether the revisions are preceded by periodic 
financial disclosure and/or timely technical disclosure, and also to ascertain the impact 
and speed of each of these forecast revisions on stock price changes. Also in section 3.3, 
we perform the same event study separately for analysts employed by major brokerage 
and investment firms, and those employed by other firms, to analyse whether there is a 
‘hierarchy’ of analysts with a relatively small number digesting and disseminating 
critical technical disclosures. In section 3.4, we examine whether analysts learn, and if 
so whether this is a function of the use of any periodic financial and timely technical 
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disclosures (whether separately or as complements), the speed of reaction to such 
disclosures, the intensity in their use, or the extent of analyst experience. 
3.1. Sample 
The setting is the microprocessor industry, and its leading company (Intel). We 
use individual analyst forecasts and revisions regarding Intel from 2000 to 2007, based 
on data gathered from I/B/E/S detail database. 11  In our setting, numerous analysts 
follow Intel and issue earnings-forecast revisions. Our sample consists of 134 distinct 
sell-side analysts employed by 83 brokerage and investment firms, which, during the 
period of our analysis, represented both major firms (i.e., Merrill Lynch, Goldman 
Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Morgan Stanley) and other firms. Following Phillips and 
Zuckerman (2001) and Hong and Kubik (2003), the measure of the brokerage and 
investment firm hierarchy is derived from the ranking published by Institutional 
Investor magazine. Each year Institutional Investor ranks 10 or so brokerage and 
investment firms as ‘The Leaders’. We classify the firms in this annual pool as major.  
The forecast revisions represent the release of new reports by individual analysts, 
with revisions in quarterly and annual forecasts, totalling 3,837 observations over the 
sample period. Each observation contains the identity of the brokerage firm, the identity 
of the analyst, the forecast release date, the forecast earnings per share, and the forecast 
period interval. Table 1 (Panel A) provides descriptive statistics of the analyst forecast 
revisions in our sample. The number of revisions per year is on average 479.625. The 
highest number of revisions in a year is 565 (2005), while the lowest number of 
revisions in a year is 379 (in 2007). The number of analysts issuing at least one revision 
during a year is on average 49.625, with a minimum of 42 (in 2001) and a maximum of 
58 (in 2003). Given that many analysts issue forecasts, multiple analyst reports can be 
released on a given day, and thus the average number of analyst reports released per 
report date matters. The average number of analysts issuing a revision on a given date is 
1.909, with a maximum of 2.240 (in 2005) and a minimum of 1.510 (in 2007). For most 
of the quarters in our sample, Intel averaged about two analyst reports on a trading day. 
The average number of revisions per analyst in each year over the sample period is 
9.626, with a maximum of 10.870 (in 2005) and a minimum of 7.730 (in 2007). 
 
11 We obtained I/B/E/S data across a sequence of two downloads (in December 2006 and June 2008) for 
the entire sample period. Differently from Ljungqvist et al. (2009), we do not observe any change in the 
number of recommendations per analyst, in the value of the earnings forecasts and in the release forecast 
date. Data are available on request from the authors. 
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We obtained Intel stock prices and the Nasdaq Composite Index from Datastream 
for each trading day (excluding scheduled market holidays). As for periodic financial 
information, we obtained annual and quarterly financial data for Intel (earnings per 
share, gross margin, inventory, accounts receivable) from Datastream and Compustat. 
Financial disclosure events (and their respective dates) are either the preliminary 
earnings announcements collected from Compustat, or the earlier of the SEC receipt 
dates from 10Ks and annual reports. 
The identification of both periodic and timely technical disclosures is rather more 
complex, as the data is not readily available in a form amenable to econometric 
analysis. With regard to periodic technical disclosure (used in the association study), we 
refer to the sources identified by Miller and O’Leary (2000), namely the reports 
provided by the very small group of independent technical analysts, who are separate 
from the sell-side analysts.12 Here, periodic technical disclosure on Intel’s products is 
taken to be that contained in a widely used In-Stat Report on ‘Intel Manufacturing 
Capacity and Die Costs’ (McGregor, 2005, 2007), where data on the most relevant 
features of microprocessors (total chip cost, average die size and average die cost) are 
provided on a quarterly basis from 2000 to 2007. The processor die size – a pure size 
measure which does not take into account die complexity – directly affects the number 
of dies that can be made from a single wafer, as well as affecting the yield of good chips 
from the wafer. 13  This yield, in turn, is a key factor in determining the cost of a 
processor and how rapidly new generations of processors can be introduced (McGregor, 
2005, p. 9). The total cost of a processor is termed chip cost, given as the sum of the die 
cost (a measure of manufacturing costs that capture die complexity) and the packaging 
cost (a critical cost area for modern processors). Reduced die size, reduced die cost, and 
reduced chip cost should result in a better cost-performance ratio for a microprocessor. 
Table 1 (Panel B) provides descriptive statistics of the periodic financial and technical 
disclosures used. 
Regarding the timely technical disclosure events used in the event study, the 
source consists of web-based press releases provided by Intel on its web site. Two of the 
 
12 According to Miller and O’Leary, technical analysts ‘play a pivotal role in the evaluation of products 
and processes in the industry… and function both as a “filter” and as a third-party evaluation and 
validation resource for analysts’ (Miller and O’Leary, 2000, p. 2). 
13 Microprocessors are built from silicon wafers, which are thin disks. Each wafer may contain many 
chips of the same type. An individual chip is called a die. Chips are usually laid out in a grid pattern, and 
arranged to fit as many as possible on the wafer. A single wafer can hold more chips if they are smaller. 
Because chips are so small, many external factors (i.e., particle of dust or  tiny  impurities  in  the silicon) 
can cause defects in the die.  
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researchers independently identified a full set of press releases for the period July 2004-
December 2007. We start the observation period in July 2004 because it was only after 
the introduction of the ‘Global Analyst Research Settlement’ (SEC, 2003) that Intel 
started to systematically disclose relevant press releases on a regular basis. The two 
researchers then collectively reviewed all events, and classified them according to 
impact (high/low), and according to impact on the firm or on the industry as a whole. 
The classification was checked separately by the third researcher. As a robustness test, 
we also analysed the entire sample of timely technical disclosure events (see fn 14 
below). For those events that did not fit into this binary classification, a third residual 
category was created so as not to lose any data points. The definition of high-impact 
events was in terms of their anticipated effect on issues such as overall market creation, 
breakthrough technology innovation affecting production processes, and technology 
innovation affecting product design. Table 1 (Panel C) summarizes the number of 
timely technical disclosure events, obtained by classifying all the press releases that 
appeared on the Intel web site according to the year of publication and the 
type/relevance (industry/high relevance, firm/high relevance, industry/low relevance, 
firm/low relevance, others). The results shown in the paper refer to revisions preceded 
by highly-relevant (industry and firm) timely technical disclosure.14 
3.2. Periodic financial and periodic technical disclosure as 
determinants of earnings-forecast revisions: an association study 
In order to address our first research question – whether periodic technical 
disclosure is useful as a complement to periodic financial disclosure in the production of 
analysts’ forecast revisions – we conduct an association study to test what information 
analysts use when revising their estimates of future earnings. Specifically, we test here 
the extent to which periodic technical disclosure (limited here to chip costs, die size and 
die costs), when complemented by periodic financial disclosure, explains analysts’ 
forecast revisions. 
 
14 As a robustness test, we also analysed the entire sample of technical disclosure events reported on the 
Intel web site, without any assessment regarding the relevance of the disclosure event. These findings 
appear to support the classification carried out by the authors. There are 79 forecast revisions associated 
with low relevance technical disclosures. When we compute analyst forecast revisions preceded by these 
low relevance technical disclosures, the coefficient of the revision is positive (0.028) but not statistically 
significant (t=1.379). When we combine high-relevance technical disclosure and low-relevance technical 
disclosures, the analysts forecasts revisions preceded by all technical disclosures is positive (0.009) but 
again not statistically significant (t=0.810). However, when we focus on highly relevant technical 
disclosure only, the coefficient of the revisions is negative (-0.002) and significant at 10% (Table 4, Panel 
The relationship between analyst earnings-forecast revisions and the bottom-line 
financial information represents the benchmark time-series model (named Model A in 
this paper): 
ttt EPSFEPS   10       (1) 
where: FEPSt = earnings-forecast revisions, measured as the mean of the change of the 
individual earnings-forecast revisions of all analysts in each quarter t 
( ); ][ ,  tyytt FEPSFEPSFEPS
EPSt = percentage quarterly change in the earnings per share (excluding 
extraordinary items) of Intel for each quarter t, where earnings per share is that available 
to analysts at the time of forecast revision. 
To control for the use by financial analysts of a wider set of periodic financial 
disclosures in their forecasts, we then include three fundamental financial signals to 
capture information beyond earnings (named Model B). The three fundamental financial 
variables used here, defined according to Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and Amir et al. 
(2003), are adjusted versions of gross margin, inventory and accounts receivables: 
 tttttt RAVINMGEPSFEPS   43210   (2) 
where: GMt = percentage quarterly change in sales minus the percentage quarterly 
change in gross margin for Intel. A positive value suggests a loss in operating efficiency 
and cost controls; 
INVt = percentage quarterly change in inventory minus the percentage quarterly 
change in sales for Intel. A positive value usually suggests an inventory build-up, 
implying lower future earnings; 
ARt = percentage quarterly change in accounts receivable minus the percentage 
quarterly change in sales for Intel. A positive value may indicate difficulties in 
collection from customers and a deterioration in the quality of receivables.15 
To control for the role of periodic technical disclosure in determining analysts’ 
forecast revisions, we include the technical information for each quarter t, as an 
additional independent variable, together with earnings per share (named Model C):  
tttt EPSFEPS   )infoTech(210     (3) 
                                                                                                                                               
A). This suggests that disclosures qualified as low-relevance by the authors are also considered to be low-
relevance by analysts, who do not revise their forecast following these disclosures. 
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15 No multicollinearity problem affects the fundamental accounting variables in Eq. (2).  
where: Tech info = periodic technical information proxied alternatively by chip cost 
(percentage quarterly change in total chip cost for Intel’s microprocessors), die size 
(percentage quarterly change in die size for Intel’s microprocessors), and die cost 
(percentage quarterly change in the estimated cost for each Intel’s die). 16  
Finally, to control for the role of periodic technical disclosure in determining 
analysts’ forecast revisions in addition to periodic financial disclosure, we include 
technical information for each quarter t, as an additional independent variable, together 
with periodic financial data (adjusted versions of gross margin, inventory and accounts 
receivables), named Model D: 
ttttttt RAVINMGEPSFEPS   )infoTech(443210  (4) 
3.3. Periodic financial and timely technical disclosures and earnings-
forecast revisions: an event study 
Our second research question concerns whether the information content of analyst 
earnings revisions depends on whether the revisions are preceded by periodic financial 
disclosure, and/or timely technical disclosure (concerning market creation, production 
processes and product design).  We seek also to ascertain the impact and speed of each 
of these forecast revisions on stock price changes. We investigate how the information 
content of periodic financial disclosures compares to timely technical disclosures that 
result in analyst earnings-forecast revisions, and whether the information conveyed by 
forecast revisions depends upon whether forecast revisions are preceded by periodic 
financial and/or timely technical disclosure events. This allows us to differentiate 
between analyst forecast revisions based on complements and non-complements. 
To measure the magnitude of earnings-forecast revisions preceded by either 
periodic financial or timely technical disclosures, we follow two steps. First, following 
Lys and Sohn (1990), we investigate whether the magnitude of earnings-forecast 
revisions that are preceded by periodic financial disclosures differs from that of 
revisions where no periodic financial disclosure occurred between two consecutive 
forecast-release dates. Second, building on Lys and Sohn (1990), we investigate 
whether the magnitude of earnings-forecast revisions that are preceded by timely 
technical disclosures differs from that of revisions where periodic financial disclosure 
occurred before a forecast-release date. This enables us to compare, in a non-
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16 We include the periodic technical variables one at a time because they are highly correlated (correlation 
coefficients above 70%), and multicollinearity problems would affect a multivariate regression. 
complements setting, the magnitude of forecast revisions preceded by periodic financial 
disclosures with that of revisions preceded by timely technical disclosures.   It addresses 
our second research question: are periodic financial and timely technical disclosures (on 
their own and as a complement to each other) relevant in the production of analysts’ 
forecast revisions? 
Furthermore, to investigate the extent to which disclosure events provide 
additional information to investors, we identify: a) forecast revisions where at least one 
periodic financial disclosure event occurred in the forecast revision period; and b) 
forecasts where no periodic financial disclosures were issued in the forecast revision 
period. We then compare the magnitude of these two types of revisions to infer the 
information content of periodic financial disclosure in comparison to any other 





















where, for analyst y, t is the forecast-release date, and ΔFEPSyt is the earnings-per-share 
forecast revision. RRPyt and RAPyt are, respectively, the cumulative returns for Intel in the 
revision period and announcement period, RMRPyt and RMAPyt are, respectively, the 
cumulative returns on the market portfolio (Nasdaq Composite Index) in the revision 
and announcement periods. Dkyt (where k=1) is equal to 1 for forecast revisions with at 
least one periodic financial disclosure in the forecast-revision period, zero otherwise; 
Dkyt (where k=2) is equal to 1 for forecast revisions with no periodic financial  events in 
the forecast-revision period, zero otherwise. The coefficients of DkytRAPyt and DkytRMAPyt 
indicate whether revisions (either preceded by at least one periodic financial disclosure 
or with no periodic financial disclosure in the forecast-revision period) are informative 
(i.e. whether forecast revisions are correlated with stock returns in the announcement 
period), while the coefficients of RRPyt and RMRPyt indicate whether revisions reflect 
information that became known to investors in the forecast revision period. Regressions 
are estimated with analyst fixed effects to control for any analyst-specific features that 
may affect their revisions. 
We then compare forecast revisions where at least one periodic financial and/or 
one timely technical disclosure event occurred in the forecast revision period. This 
enables us to investigate further our second research question: does the release of 
forecast revisions based on periodic financial and timely technical disclosures (both on 
their own and as complements) provide new or incremental information to the stock 
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market? To avoid confusing the two types of disclosures, as shown in Figure 2, we 
assume that there is financial disclosure if at least one periodic financial disclosure 
event took place in the last four days of the forecast-revision period, and technical 
disclosures if any timely technical event took place in the period commencing two 
weeks and ending five days prior to the revision date. The length of each sub-period is 
based on the statistics for the minimum and maximum number of days needed to 
incorporate technical and financial disclosures in our sample: over the period 2004-
2007, analysts needed a minimum of 0 days up to a maximum of 3 days to react to 
periodic financial disclosures, and a minimum of 5 days up to a maximum of 14 days to 
react to timely highly-relevant technical disclosures (Table 4). 
Figure 2: Sequence of events relative to financial and technical disclosure 
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Specifically, to investigate the relevance of periodic financial disclosure and 
timely technical disclosure in providing, on their own, additional information to 



















210  (6) 
where: Dkyt (where k=1) is equal to 1 for forecast revisions with at least one periodic 
financial disclosure in the last four days of the forecast-revision period, zero otherwise; 
Dkyt (where k=2) is equal to 1 for forecast revisions with timely technical disclosure 
events in the period commencing two weeks and ending five days prior to the revision, 
zero otherwise; Dkyt (where k=3) is equal to 1 for forecast revisions with neither timely 
technical disclosure nor periodic financial disclosure, zero otherwise. The coefficients 
of DkytRAPyt and DkytRMAPyt indicate whether revisions (preceded by periodic financial 
disclosure, timely technical disclosure, or no disclosure in the forecast-revision period) 
are informative, while the coefficients of RRPyt and RMRPyt indicate whether revisions 
reflect information that became known to investors in the forecast revision period. 
Next, and in order to test whether periodic financial and timely highly-relevant 
technical disclosure complement each other, we include in our analysis all the revisions 
preceded by periodic financial disclosure (both on its own, and in conjunction with 
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timely technical disclosure) and timely highly-relevant technical disclosure (both on its 
own, and in conjunction with periodic financial disclosure). This enables us to test 
whether these two signals complement each other, although it is possible that this is due 
to a confounding effect (i.e. financial disclosure that just converts information provided 
in prior timely technical disclosure). To avoid the confounding effect, we also test what 
happens when there are no potential complements, that is where revisions are preceded 
either by timely technical disclosure only, or by periodic financial disclosure only. 
To address our third research question – whether there is a hierarchy of analysts in 
this particular setting, and if so whether it has any effects – we run the analyses 
separately for analysts employed by major brokerage and investment firms and those 
employed by other firms.  
3.4. Analyst information processing and analyst forecast accuracy 
In order to investigate our fourth research question – whether analysts learn, and if 
so how – we investigate whether analysts use either periodic financial or timely 
technical disclosures (on their own or as complements) when revising their earnings 
forecasts, how quickly they react to such disclosures, how intense their use is, and how 
much experience they have. Specifically, we investigate whether analysts that react less 
quickly to periodic financial or timely technical disclosure are more accurate, whether 
analysts that make more intense use of such disclosure are more accurate, whether 
analysts that are more expert are more accurate (i.e. whether they learn over time), and 
whether more expert analysts are more accurate when they make more use of timely 
technical disclosure. 
Our multivariate test of whether analyst information processing affects analyst 
forecast accuracy is based on equation (7), estimated for each analyst-quarter both in the 



























    (7) 
where: Accuracyyt = absolute value of actual earnings minus the earnings forecast made 
by analyst y in quarter t, deflated by the end-of quarter price (i.e. higher values, lower 
accuracy); 
Dkyt = 1 when analyst y reacts in quarter t at least to one disclosure event k, which 
is either periodic financial disclosure (k=1) or timely technical disclosure (k=2); 
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Speedkyt = average number of days analyst y employs in quarter t to react to event 
k, which is either periodic financial disclosure or timely technical disclosure (i.e. higher 
values, lower speed); 
Intensitykyt = number of disclosure events that analyst y employs in quarter t, 
where disclosure k is either periodic financial disclosure or timely technical disclosure 
(i.e. higher values, increased intensity); 
Experienceyt = ln of the number of previous quarters analyst y issued a forecast at 
quarter t (as proxied, among others, in Mikhail et al., 1997, 2003; Jacob et al., 1999). 
Finally in order to investigate whether analyst learning is a function of the 





































The investigation of our first research question (i.e. whether periodic technical 
disclosure is useful as a complement to periodic financial disclosure for the production 
of analysts’ forecast revisions) is based on an association study at quarterly intervals (as 
formalised in equations 1-4). Technical information here is the periodic information 
concerning chip cost, die size and die cost. Table 2 reports the results on the relevance 
of periodic financial versus periodic technical disclosure as determinants of earnings-
forecast revisions. 17  To highlight the association between analysts’ revisions and 
financial variables, in columns A and B of' Table 2 we report the results of regressing 
earnings-forecast revisions on the changes of earnings per share and on the changes in 
fundamental financial information, without including any of the technical variables.  We 
find that earnings per share have a positive (and statistically significant at 5%) 
coefficient of 0.145, as expected (column A). Including the fundamental financial 
information in the regression (column B), the coefficients of gross margin (GM) and 
inventory (INV) are negative as expected (and statistically significant, respectively, at 
5% and 1%), indicating that disproportionate increases in inventory (relative to sales), 
and disproportionate decreases in gross margin, are viewed negatively by analysts. 
 16
 17
                                                                                                                                              
Finally, the explanatory power of model B is much higher than the explanatory power 
of model A: Adj-R2 increases to 40.4% from 14.1%. Such an increase indicates that 
fundamental financial information shows substantial incremental value-relevance over 
earnings changes.  
In the remaining columns of Table 2 we report the results of examining the 
incremental explanatory power of the periodic technical variables (chip cost, die size 
and die cost) when complemented with periodic financial disclosure. When combined 
with the change in earnings per share we find, as one would expect, that positive 
changes (i.e. increases) in chip cost and die cost have negative (and statistically 
significant at 5%) coefficients, indicating that increases in chip cost and die cost are 
viewed negatively by analysts. When combined with periodic financial disclosure, chip 
cost and die cost maintain a negative coefficient (statistically significant at 1%), and 
also die size coefficient becomes negative and statistically significant at 10%. The 
magnitude of the chip and die coefficients suggests that changes in chip cost, die size 
and die cost have a substantial effect on analysts’ earnings-forecast revisions. For 
instance, a 1 percent increase in chip cost implies a 0.426 percent increase in earnings-
forecast revision (statistically significant at 1%). The strong explanatory power of 
models C and D indicates that periodic technical disclosures (especially chip cost and 
die cost, relative to die size, and consistent with the intuition that chip cost and die cost 
reflect both die size and die complexity) explain a relatively large portion of the 
variation in analysts’ revisions. Results appear to indicate not only the incremental 
contribution of periodic technical disclosure in terms of increased Adj-R2, but also that 
the contribution is substantial. When such technical disclosures are combined with 
earnings per share only, the value of Adj-R2 increases from 0.141 in model A to 0.221 
in model C1 (and to 0.233 in C3) – a substantial gain of 57% (65%). When periodic 
technical disclosures are combined with periodic financial disclosure, the value of Adj-
R2 increases, although to a lesser extent than in the previous case, from 0.405 in model 
B to 0.544 in model C1 (and to 0.420 in C3) – a gain of 34% (6%).  Overall, and as 
expected, periodic disclosures pertaining to chip cost, die size and die cost is important 
in forecasting Intel’s earnings, and this explains why there is a demand for technical 
information in this industry. 
 
17 To control for cross-correlations in the residuals across time, we repeat our tests separated for each of 
the quarters ending at March, June, September, and December from 2000 to 2007. 
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The investigation of our second research question (i.e. the effects on both analysts 
and investors of timely technical disclosure and/or periodic financial disclosure) is 
based on event studies centered on the announcement date of each disclosure (as 
formalised in equations 5-6). We begin by comparing the magnitude of the revisions 
classified according to the type (periodic financial vs. timely technical) of disclosure 
preceding the revision, and the number of days needed by analysts to react to the 
different types (financial vs. technical) of disclosure.  Table 3 reports the evidence on 
periodic financial disclosure relative to other non-financial disclosures (including timely 
technical disclosures) in analyst earnings-forecast revisions. A number of observations 
can be made regarding this data. The number of total revisions preceded by periodic 
financial disclosure (3,022) is almost four times that of revisions not preceded by 
periodic financial disclosure (815). Consistent with these results, the number of 
revisions per analyst preceded by periodic financial disclosure (22.72) is more than 
double the number of revisions not preceded by periodic financial disclosure (9.06). The 
length of the forecast-revision period is 63 calendar days for revisions with at least one 
periodic financial disclosure event in the forecast revision period, and 36 for revisions 
not preceded by any periodic financial disclosure. This is consistent with the lower 
frequency of periodic financial disclosures relative to the higher frequency of other 
disclosures, including timely technical disclosures.18 More important, the mean absolute 
values of the forecast revision are very similar (0.130 and 0.134) for the two sub-
samples.19 This result indicates that, on average, the information content of periodic 
financial disclosures (as distinct from the speed of the reaction) is not different from the 
information content of other non-financial disclosure events that result in analysts’ 
earnings-forecast revisions. This highlights the importance of investigating further the 
content and impact of other corporate disclosures, and particularly where 
complementary signals may exist. As already noted, we focus in this paper on a 
particular set of technical disclosures, and how they may interact with periodic financial 
disclosures, given the nature of the industry studied. 
Table 4 reports the impact of timely technical and periodic financial disclosures 
(both on their own and as a complement to each other) on analyst earnings-forecast 
revisions. When we focus on a framework of non-complements between periodic 
 
18 The t-test (31.77, p<0.01) confirms that the length of the forecast revision period is smaller for the non-
financial disclosure sub-sample. 
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financial and timely highly-relevant technical disclosures (Panel A), we observe that the 
total number of revisions preceded by periodic financial disclosure only (491) is higher 
than that of revisions preceded by timely highly-relevant technical disclosure only 
(239). Also, the number of revisions per analyst preceded by periodic financial 
disclosures only (7.67) is much larger than the number of revisions per analyst preceded 
by timely highly-relevant technical disclosures only (4.60). Moreover, less analysts 
issue revisions preceded by timely technical disclosures (52), rather than by periodic 
financial disclosures (64). Interestingly, the number of days it takes for analysts to react 
to periodic financial disclosures is substantially lower than for timely highly-relevant 
technical disclosures (1.175 days, relative to 8.902 days for the period 2004-7). This 
additional time required for analysts to revise forecasts in light of timely technical 
disclosures could be explained by the costs (primarily in terms of time) financial 
analysts incur when using and digesting timely technical information provided by 
technical analysts. Finally, the forecast revisions following timely highly-relevant 
technical disclosures tend to be negative, whereas the forecast revisions following 
periodic financial disclosures tend to be positive (-0.002 and 0.034 respectively). When 
we focus on a framework where complements may exist between periodic financial and 
timely highly-relevant technical disclosures (Panel B), the total number of revisions, the 
number of revisions per analyst, and the number of days it takes analysts to react to 
disclosure are higher than when there is periodic financial disclosure only, and higher 
also than when there is technical disclosure only. The magnitude of the forecast 
revisions following timely highly-relevant technical (also in conjunction with periodic 
financial disclosure) and periodic financial disclosures (also in conjunction with timely 
technical disclosure) are both positive (0.013 and 0.026, respectively, with the 
difference statistically significant). This result indicates that, on average, analysts’ 
earnings-forecast revisions are induced more by periodic financial disclosures (or by 
periodic financial disclosures that just convert information provided in prior timely 
technical disclosures) in their upward revisions. Finally, a comparison of the number of 
analysts under the non-complements vs. complements framework (Table 4, Panels A & 
B: 52 vs. 72) reveals that many more analysts use timely technical disclosure together 
with periodic financial disclosure, rather than timely technical disclosure only. 
Similarly, the comparison of the number of revisions per analyst (Table 4, Panels A & 
 
19 The t-test (0.011, insignificant) suggests that the magnitude of the forecast revisions following financial 
disclosure is the same as the magnitude of forecast revisions with no financial disclosure in the forecast-
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B: 7.67 vs. 15.56) shows that analysts produce approximately double the number of 
revisions when they use timely technical disclosure complemented by periodic financial 
disclosure, rather than timely technical disclosure only.  
The information content of periodic financial disclosures only, measured by the 
association between analyst earnings forecasts and price changes depending upon the 
forecast-release date relative to periodic financial disclosure (as formalised in Eq. 5), is 
reported in Table 5 (Panel A). The values for the cumulative returns for Intel in the 
announcement period are 0.807 and 1.100, respectively, with and without any periodic 
financial disclosures preceding the revision (both p<0.01). This suggests that the 
correlation between analyst earnings-forecast revisions and contemporaneous stock 
price changes is higher when forecast revisions are not preceded by periodic financial 
disclosures in comparison to when forecasts are preceded by such disclosures. This 
indicates that the correlation between stock returns in the announcement period and 
earnings-forecast revisions is higher when the change in earnings expectations is caused 
by corporate announcements not directly related to periodic financial information in 
comparison to when the change in earnings expectations is driven by periodic financial 
disclosures. This result differs from the one in previous studies (Lys and Sohn, 1990) 
and warrants further research to examine what other types of corporate disclosure events 
(e.g., technical disclosure) occur in the sub-sample where no periodic financial releases 
were issued in the forecast-revision period.  
Table 5 (Panel B) shows the information content of both periodic financial and 
timely technical disclosures, but in a setting where they are not used as complements (as 
formalised in Eq. 6). We offer several observations on these results. First, the 
relationship between analyst earnings-forecast revisions and contemporaneous changes 
in Intel’s stock price is negative and large (-1.326) when forecast revisions are preceded 
by timely highly-relevant technical disclosures only, whereas it is positive and 
significant (0.769) when forecasts are preceded by periodic financial disclosures only. 
This means that revisions induced by timely technical disclosures are a surprise (even if 
negative) to markets, while revisions induced by periodic financial disclosures tend to 
be a surprise, but to a positive (and lesser) extent. A possible interpretation is that the 
price impact becomes negative in the presence of variables that proxy for higher 
information asymmetry, where this is due to particularly complex information 




technical disclosures are more difficult to digest and interpret than periodic financial 
disclosures, therefore in the short-term prices reflect to a lesser extent timely highly-
relevant technical information.  Because of this higher information asymmetry, analyst 
forecasts following timely technical disclosure only are a surprise for the market, which 
reacts negatively as a result.  This is consistent with Zuckerman (2004, p. 409), who 
suggests that it is unrealistic to assume that all investors (analysts) will interpret 
information in the same way.  Note also that the negative market surprises due to timely 
technical disclosure may be explained in relation to the negative earnings-forecast 
revisions associated with timely technical disclosure documented in Table 4, Panel A.  
Second, the findings in Table 5 (Panel A) of a higher magnitude for those revisions not 
preceded by periodic financial disclosure (1.100), relative to those revisions preceded 
by periodic financial disclosures (0.807) may, we suggest, be due to the former being 
driven indirectly by technical disclosure.  Third, periodic financial disclosure tends to 
be related to the state of the economy, whereas timely technical disclosure is not 
associated with the state of the economy (proxied by the market return in the 
announcement period). Finally, the explanatory power of the regression including 
timely technical disclosure is substantially greater than the explanatory power of the 
regression based on periodic financial disclosure only (Adj-R2 equal to 21.53% for 
equation 6 and to 12.41% for equation 5). This suggests the incremental value relevance 
of timely technical disclosure relative to periodic financial disclosure, when each is 
considered separately (i.e. not as complementary signals).  
In the framework where complements may exist between financial and technical 
disclosure (Table 5, Panel C), the evidence for periodic financial disclosure is very 
similar to that for the non-complements framework (i.e. a positive and significant 
coefficient equal respectively to 0.760 and 0.769).  However, the evidence for timely 
technical disclosure, when complemented by periodic financial disclosure (that may 
also be converting timely technical disclosure), differs significantly from the one in the 
non-complements framework (i.e. a negative coefficient of -1.326 under no 
complements, and a positive coefficient of 0.452 under complements). Timely technical 
disclosure complemented by periodic financial disclosure induces a positive relationship 
between analyst earnings-forecast revisions and contemporaneous changes in Intel’s 
stock price. When forecast revisions are preceded by timely highly-relevant technical 
disclosures, together with periodic financial disclosure converting timely technical 
disclosure, forecast revisions are positive (as documented in Table 4, Panel B), as 
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indicated by increases in market prices. Also, timely technical disclosure (in the 
complements framework) is related to the state of the economy and negatively affects 
analysts’ revisions through market returns. 
As regards our third research question, we run the analyses separately for analysts 
employed by major brokerage and investment firms, and those employed by other firms. 
Table 6 (Panel A) reports the impact of timely technical and periodic financial 
disclosures on earnings-forecast revisions for analysts at major firms, both where there 
are no complements, and where complements may exist.  Table 6 (Panel B) does the 
same for other firms.  In both the framework of complements and the framework of 
non-complements, we observe that the number of revisions per analyst (preceded by 
either periodic financial or timely highly-relevant technical disclosure) is larger for 
analysts employed at major firms relative to analysts at other firms.  This is particularly 
the case for the framework of non-complements, and for timely technical disclosure 
only (7.33 and 4.12 respectively).  This suggests that analysts at major firms follow 
such disclosures more closely, and that there may be a ‘hierarchy’ of analysts in this 
particular industry with respect to complex and timely technical disclosures. For both 
major and other firms, we find confirmation of the results observed for the overall 
sample: the total number of revisions preceded by periodic financial disclosure only is 
higher than that of revisions preceded by timely highly-relevant technical disclosure 
only (for major firms 146 and 88 respectively; for other firms 357 and 165 
respectively); also, the number of revisions per analyst preceded by periodic financial 
disclosures only is larger than the number of revisions per analyst preceded by timely 
highly-relevant technical disclosures only, especially for analysts employed at other 
firms (for major firms 8.11 and 7.33 respectively; for other firms 7.60 and 4.12 
respectively). When we focus on a framework of non-complements between periodic 
financial and timely highly-relevant technical disclosures, we observe that the forecast 
revisions following timely highly-relevant technical disclosure are negative for analysts 
employed at other brokerage and investment firms (as in the overall sample: Table 4, 
Panel A), whereas they are positive for analysts employed at major firms (-0.009 and 
0.011 respectively). This result provides an interesting nuance to our evidence of a 
negative reaction for the overall sample in the framework of non-complements. When 
we focus on a framework of complements between periodic financial and timely highly-
relevant technical disclosures, the magnitude of the forecast revisions following timely 
highly-relevant technical (also in conjunction with periodic financial disclosure) and 
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periodic financial disclosures (also in conjunction with timely technical disclosure) are 
positive for analysts at both major and other firms. This result confirms that of the 
overall sample.  
Table 7 (Panels A and B) shows the specific information content of timely 
technical disclosures (as formalised in Eq. 6) for both analysts employed by major 
brokerage and investment firms and for those employed by other firms. In the no 
complements framework (Panel A), there is only one significant and positive (0.989) 
relationship between analyst earnings-forecast revisions and contemporaneous changes 
in Intel’s stock price, which occurs when forecast revisions are issued by analysts at 
other firms and revisions are preceded by periodic financial disclosures. In the 
framework of complements (Panel B), for analysts employed by major brokerage and 
investment firms, the relationship between analyst earnings-forecast revisions and 
contemporaneous changes in Intel’s stock price is positive and large (1.105) when 
forecast revisions are preceded by timely highly-relevant technical disclosures (that may 
also be converting periodic financial disclosure), whereas it is non-significant when 
forecasts are preceded by periodic financial disclosures (that may also be converting 
timely technical disclosure). Contrarily, for analysts employed by other brokerage and 
investment firms, the relationship between analyst earnings-forecast revisions and 
contemporaneous changes in Intel’s stock price is positive and large (0.882) when 
forecast revisions are preceded by periodic financial disclosures (that may also be 
converting highly-relevant technical disclosure), whereas it is non-significant when 
forecasts are preceded by highly-relevant technical disclosures (that may also be 
converting periodic financial disclosure). This means that revisions induced by timely 
technical disclosures are a positive surprise to markets when issued by analysts at major 
firms, while revisions induced by periodic financial disclosures tend to be a positive 
surprise, but to a lesser extent, when issued by analysts at other firms. We also compute 
standardized coefficients to assess the relative strength of each disclosure type for 
different analyst types.  We observe that the changes in Intel’s stock price preceded by 
timely technical disclosure have the largest standardized coefficient (0.186) for analysts 
employed at major brokerage houses, whereas the changes in Intel’s stock price 
preceded by periodic financial disclosure have the largest standardized coefficient 
(0.181) for analysts employed by other brokerage and investment firms.20 This evidence 
further develops the result observed for the overall sample: the increase in market prices 
 
20 Standardized coefficients are available from the authors upon request. 
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documented for both financial and technical disclosure (Table 5, Panel C) can be better 
explained by distinguishing between analysts at major and analysts at other firms. In 
fact, there is an increase in market prices induced by revisions preceded by timely 
technical disclosures only when revisions are issued by analysts at major firms, whereas 
there is an increase in market prices induced by revisions preceded by periodic financial 
disclosures only when revisions are issued by analysts at other firms. 
The investigation of our fourth research question (i.e. whether analysts learn, and 
if so how) focuses on the use of periodic financial and timely technical disclosures (on 
their own and as complements), the speed of reaction to such disclosures, the intensity 
in their use, and the extent of analyst experience (as formalised in equations 7-8). In the 
no complements framework (Table 8, Panel A, Eq. 7), we find that a lower speed in 
reacting to timely technical disclosure increases accuracy (coefficient equal to -0.001 
significant at 5 percent level), whereas the speed in reacting to periodic financial 
disclosure does not influence accuracy (coefficient equal to 0.001 not significant). This 
result is consistent with the presence in the industry of a small number of technical 
analysts digesting and disseminating critical information.  Financial analysts using the 
digested information take longer to produce their forecasts, but then produce more 
accurate forecasts. The speed of reaction to periodic financial disclosure has no impact 
on accuracy, suggesting that financial analysts do not need to wait for digested periodic 
financial information from others. Moreover, we find that a higher intensity in the use 
of either periodic financial disclosure, or timely technical disclosure, results in lower 
accuracy (both coefficients equal to 0.001 significant at 5 percent level). This suggests 
that, when analysts do not exploit the complements between technical and financial 
disclosures, their accuracy declines due to the increased frequency of use of timely 
technical disclosure only. In the non-complements framework, analysts with more 
experience regarding Intel tend to be less accurate (coefficient equal to 0.001 significant 
at 1 percent level). Further (Table 8, Panel A, Eq. 8), we find that the more intense use 
of this information by more experienced analysts does not impact on the learning 
process (coefficient equal to 0.001 not significant).  This suggests that analysts do not 
learn over time, when controlling for other features of their information processing. 
This adds to the already mixed evidence on the effect of experience on learning (see 
Kothari, 2001; Jacob et al., 1999). Finally, to assess the economic significance of these 
results (in terms of relative strength of each of the predictors), we compute standardized 
coefficients. Interestingly, the speed of reaction to timely technical disclosure has the 
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largest standardized coefficient (in absolute value), -0.258, whereas experience, 
intensity in the use of timely technical, and intensity in the use of periodic financial 
disclosure fall in the middle (standardized coefficients respectively of 0.134, 0.141 and 
0.179). Thus, a one standard deviation increase in the speed of reaction to timely 
technical disclosure leads to a 0.258 standard deviation decrease in predicted accuracy, 
with the other variables held constant. 
In the complements framework (Table 8, Panel B, Eq. 7), we find confirmation of 
the result concerning speed of incorporating timely technical disclosure (also in 
conjunction with periodic financial disclosure): a lower speed in reacting to timely 
technical disclosure increases accuracy (coefficient equal to -0.001 significant at 5 
percent level), consistent with financial analysts taking increased time to digest 
technical information. In this framework, a lower speed in reacting to periodic financial 
disclosure increases accuracy too (coefficient equal to -0.001 significant at 5 percent 
level) due also, we suggest, to the time taken to digest timely technical disclosure. 
Moreover, we find that a higher intensity in the use of timely technical disclosure (in 
conjunction with periodic financial disclosure) in a given quarter results in higher 
accuracy (coefficient equal to -0.001 significant at 10 percent level), whereas a higher 
intensity in the use of periodic financial disclosure (in conjunction with timely technical 
disclosure) results in lower accuracy (coefficient equal to 0.001 significant at 5 percent 
level). The intuition here is that, when using technical disclosure, and given the 
complexity of the technical information, analysts need to use more disclosure events to 
be more accurate, whereas an increased intensity in the use of periodic financial 
disclosure suggests the need for the analyst to revise their previous inaccurate forecasts. 
Interestingly, experience on its own continues to have a negative effect on accuracy 
(coefficient equal to 0.001 significant at 1 percent level): analysts do not learn over 
time, when controlling for other features of their information processing (Jacob et al., 
1999). But, when we consider the interaction effect between experience and intensity in 
the use of timely technical disclosure (also in conjunction with periodic financial 
disclosure), we observe that experience in itself does not impact on analyst forecast 
accuracy, whereas an increased intensity of use of technical information by more 
experienced analysts impacts negatively on accuracy (coefficient equal to 0.001 
significant at 10 percent level). 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper is a response to Bradshaw’s (2009, 2011) call for accounting 
researchers to open up the ‘black box’ of information processing by analysts.  This is 
particularly important in information environments with multiple and potentially 
complementary components, and where technical information is particularly important 
and hard to digest. A relatively small number of studies in accounting have examined 
multiple and potentially complementary information sources, including non-financial 
information (Amir and Lev, 1996; Francis et al., 2002; Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005).  
Consistent with Bradshaw’s argument that the study of information processing is not 
easily accessed by conventional multi-firm archival studies, we have used hand gathered 
technical data contained in web-based press releases, alongside non-traditional technical 
data contained in the reports of technical analysts, to allow us to differentiate the impact 
of the three components of the information environment of the microprocessor industry 
– periodic financial information, periodic technical information, and timely technical 
information – and to examine their interaction. 
Based on 3,837 analyst earnings-forecast revisions, issued by 134 analysts, our 
findings are as follows. First, and as expected, we find that periodic technical disclosure 
when used on its own explains a relatively large portion of the variation in analysts’ 
forecast revisions, suggesting not only the incremental contribution of periodic technical 
disclosure, but also that the contribution is substantial.  Second, we find that analysts 
take much longer (approximately one week more) to react to timely technical 
disclosures relative to periodic financial disclosures.  We suggest that this could be 
explained by the time required to digest complex technical disclosures that are 
particularly significant within the information environment that characterises the 
microprocessor industry. We find also that, when analysts use timely technical 
disclosures jointly with periodic financial disclosures in their earnings-forecast 
revisions, their forecast revisions are particularly informative. This confirms our 
intuition that technical and financial information may be complementary sources of 
information for analysts in this particular industry.  Third, we find evidence that there is 
a ‘hierarchy’ of analysts in this particular setting, with analysts at major firms following 
timely technical disclosures more closely, and such disclosures having a greater impact 
on market prices.  Finally, we find that lower speed in reacting to timely technical 
disclosures increases accuracy, which is consistent with the presence in the industry of a 
small number of technical analysts digesting and disseminating critical information.  
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We find also that a higher intensity in the use of timely technical disclosure (in 
conjunction with periodic financial disclosure) results in greater accuracy.  
More generally, and for this particular setting, these findings confirm the 
importance of technical disclosures, that there are complements between technical and 
financial disclosures, that timely technical disclosures are of particular importance in 
this regard, and that there exists a ‘hierarchy’ of analysts.  Taken together, this suggests 
that the how of information processing merits much greater attention by accounting 
researchers.  We still know relatively little about the exact nature of the relation 
between different types of information, how such different and potentially 
complementary signals are processed, how quickly, and how this is achieved by 
different types of analysts. 
We are conscious of the limitations of a single company study, particularly given 
the predominant focus of the analyst literature to date on multi-firm samples.  However, 
we contend that this approach, and the hand-gathered and non-traditional data on which 
it depends, offers a way of exploring questions that accounting researchers are keenly 
interested in, but which are not easily addressed by empirical archival research methods.  
In any event, the scholarly study of information processing in specific industry settings 
with multiple, complex, and potentially complementary sources of information can add 
to our understanding of the world.  Finally, while noting the distinctiveness of the 
microprocessor industry, we suggest that our findings regarding the how of information 
processing in this industry may have relevance for other industries such as the Bio-Tech 
Pharma industry. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics  
Panel A (on analyst earnings-forecast revisions) reports descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, 
minimum, median and maximum computed on yearly data across the sample period 2000-2007) on (1) 
total number per year of earnings-forecast revisions, which occur when there is a change in the value of 
two consecutive earnings forecasts produced by a given individual analyst, (2) total number of analysts 
issuing revisions, (3) total number of revisions per analysts, (4) number of revisions per trading day. 
Individual analyst forecasts are obtained from I/B/E/S. Over the period 2000-2007, the total number of 
revisions is 3,837 and the total number of analysts issuing revisions is 134. Panel B (on periodic 
disclosure) reports descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, median and maximum 
computed on quarterly data) for the period 2000-2007 on the percentage quarterly change of (1) earnings 
per share of Intel [ΔEPS], (2) gross margin for Intel [ΔGM], (3) inventory for Intel [ΔINV], (4) accounts 
receivable for Intel [AR], (5) total chip cost for Intel’s microprocessors [Δ(Chip cost)], (6) die size (i.e. 
size of each individual chip formed on a silicon wafer) for Intel [Δ (Die size)], (7) estimated cost for each 
Intel’s die [Δ (Die cost)]. Panel B also reports descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, 
median and maximum computed on quarterly data) for the period 2000-2007 on the adjusted versions of 
gross margin, inventory and accounts receivables, defined according to Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and 
Amir et al. (2003): (8) percentage quarterly change in sales minus the percentage quarterly change in 
gross margin [ΔGM], (9) percentage quarterly change in inventory minus the percentage quarterly 
change in sales [ΔINV], (10) percentage quarterly change in accounts receivable minus the percentage 
quarterly change in sales [ΔAR]. Annual and quarterly financial data are obtained from Datastream and 
Compustat. Technical data (total chip cost, die size and die cost) are obtained from reports of a technical 
analyst firm (McGregor, 2007). Panel C (on timely technical disclosure) reports the number of disclosure 
events in each year classified in five categories: (1) Industry/High relevance, i.e. disclosure with high 
impact in terms of their anticipated industry-wide effects on issues such as overall market creation; (2) 
Firm/High relevance, i.e. firm-specific and product-specific disclosure with high impact (i.e. 
breakthrough technology innovation affecting production processes and products); (3) Industry/Low 
relevance; (4) Firm/Low relevance; (5) Others. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on the analyst earnings-forecast revisions 
2000-07        Mean St. dev. Min Median Max 
Number of revisions 479.625 84.883 379.000 503.500 565.000 
Number of analysts 49.625 4.868 42.000 50.000 58.000 
Number of revisions per analyst 9.626 1.095 7.730 9.645 10.870 
Number of revisions per day 1.909 0.332 1.510 2.000 2.240 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on periodic financial and technical information 
2000-07        Mean St. dev. Min Median Max 
ΔEPS 0.011 0.057 -0.558 0.219 0.368 
ΔGM 0.301 0.030 -0.893 1.624 8.901 
ΔINV 0.031 0.031 -0.176 0.102 0.214 
ΔAR -0.004 0.017 -0.197 0.123 0.206 
Δ(Chip cost) -0.001 0.001 -0.196 0.064 0.156 
Δ(Die size) 0.002 0.001 -0.096 0.044 0.097 
Δ(Die cost) -0.002 0.001 -0.182 0.088 0.187 
ΔGM -0,288 1,637 -8,976 -0,008 1,009 
ΔINV 0,017 0,167 -0,309 0,007 0,416 
ΔAR -0,016 0,140 -0,303 0,007 0,214 
Panel C: Distribution of timely technical disclosure events by type/year 
Year Industry/High relevance Firm /High relevance Industry/Low relevance Firm/Low relevance Others Panel
2004  10 9 4 8 3 34
2005 17 29 5 8 1 60
2006  19 2 27 16 64
2007  9  27 13 49
2000-07 27 66 11 70 33 207
Table 2  
Regression analysis: quarterly determinants of earnings-forecast revisions 
The determinants of earnings-forecast revisions include periodic financial disclosures and periodic technical disclosures over each quarter (as defined in Table 1, Panel 
B). In the OLS regression used, the dependent variable is the analyst earnings-forecast revision. The explanatory variables (whose coefficients are j) are grouped into 
different specifications: (A) percentage quarterly change in earnings per share only; (B) percentage quarterly change in other periodic fundamental financial 
information (percentage quarterly change in sales minus the percentage quarterly change in gross margin ΔGM, percentage quarterly change in inventory minus the 
percentage quarterly change in sales ΔINV, percentage quarterly change in accounts receivable minus the percentage quarterly change in sales ΔAR) in addition to the 
percentage quarterly change in earnings per share; (C) percentage quarterly change in periodic technical information (total chip cost, die size and die cost respectively 
in C1, C2 and C3) together with the percentage quarterly change in earnings per share; (D) percentage quarterly change in periodic technical information (total chip 
cost, die size and die cost respectively in C1, C2 and C3) together with the percentage quarterly change in periodic financial information. The test refers to Intel in each 
quarter over the period 2000-2007. *, **, *** indicate two-tailed p values <0.10, <0.05 and <0.01 respectively. Standard errors are given in brackets. 
 














































ΔGM  -0.018** 
(0.007) 






ΔINV  -0.207*** 
(0.068) 






ΔAR  0.013 
(0.086) 






Δ(Chip cost)   -0.238** 
(0.19) 
  -0.426*** 
(0.103) 
  
Δ(Die size)    -0.209 
(0.176) 





Δ(Die cost)     -0.191** 
(0.091) 
  -0.235*** 
(0.083) 
N. obs 32 31 24 24 24 24 24 24 
F 6.074 6.102 4.266 2.731 4.485 6.489 2.711 3.879 
Sig. of the model 0.020 0.001 0.028 0.088 0.024 0.001 0.054 0.015 
Diagnostic 
statistics 
Adj R2 0.141 0.405 0.221 0.141 0.233 0.544 0.271 0.430 
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Table 3 
Financial disclosure and earnings-forecast revisions 
A comparison of the number of days and earnings-forecast revisions that are preceded by periodic 
financial disclosure (Panel A) with the number of days and earnings-forecast revisions where no periodic 
financial disclosure occurred between two consecutive forecast-release dates (Panel B). Days refer to the 
length of the forecast-revision period in calendar days (where for a given analyst, the forecast-revision 
period is defined as the period between consecutive forecasts). The paired sample t-test for Days is 
31.77*** (p<0.01). FEPS is the forecast revision defined as the difference in consecutive forecasts for 
an analyst. The paired sample t-test for FEPS is -0.0078. |FEPS| is the absolute value of analyst 
earnings-forecast revision. The paired sample t-test for |FEPS| is 0.011. Periodic financial disclosure 
dates are taken from Compustat and SEC. The comparison refers to Intel over the period 2000-2007.  
 Panel A: Revisions with at least one periodic 
financial disclosure between consecutive forecasts 
Panel B: Revisions with no periodic financial 
disclosure between consecutive forecasts 
 Days FEPS |FEPS| Days FEPS |FEPS| 
Mean 63 0.010 0.130 36 -0.001 0.134 
Std. Error 71 0.203 0.156 20 0.202 0.151 
Median 47 0.014 0.073 37 0.012 0.072 
Number of revisions 3022 815 
Number of analysts 133 90 





Financial and technical disclosure and analyst earnings-forecast revisions  
A comparison of the number of days and earnings-forecast revisions preceded either by i) timely technical 
disclosure only or by ii) periodic financial disclosure only (non-complements, Panel A) and of the days 
and earnings-forecast revisions preceded either by iii) timely technical disclosure or timely technical 
disclosure in conjunction with periodic financial disclosure, or by iv) periodic financial disclosure or 
periodic financial disclosure in conjunction with timely technical disclosure (complements, Panel B). 
Days refer to the number of calendar days a disclosure takes to be reflected in a forecast revision. Timely 
technical disclosure are included when highly relevant. Highly-relevant technical disclosure dates are 
identified by the researchers from the full set of Intel’s press releases (where the definition of high-
relevance was in terms of their anticipated effect on issues such as overall market creation, breakthrough 
technology innovation affecting production processes, and technology innovation affecting product 
design and, therefore, capability for the industry as a whole). Periodic financial disclosure dates are taken 
from Compustat and SEC. The comparison refers to Intel over the period July 2004-December 2007. *, 
*** indicate two-tailed p values <0.10 and <0.01 respectively 
 










ii) Revisions with 
periodic financial 
disclosure only 
iii) Revisions with 
timely highly-relevant 
technical disclosure (or 
with technical and 
financial disclosures) 
iv) Revisions with 
periodic financial 
disclosure (or with 
financial and  
technical disclosures) 
 Days FEPS Days FEPS Days FEPS Days FEPS 
Mean 8.902 -0.002 1.175 0.034 9.337 0.013 1.086 0.026 
T-stat of significance for mean   -1.687*  3.896***  2.308***  4.708*** 
Std. Error 3.100 0.150 0.456 0.196 2.427 0.165 0.414 0.183 
Min 5.000 -0.535 0.000 -0.783 5.000 -0.535 0.000 -0.783 
Median 9.000 0.001 1.000 0.026 9.000 0.017 1.000 0.026 
Max 14.000 0.960 3.000 0.545 14.000 1.173 3.000 1.173 
Number of revisions 239 491 822 1,074 
Number of analysts 52 64 72 69 
Number of revisions per 
analyst 
4.60 7.67 11.42 15.56 
     
 35
Table 5 
Information content of analyst forecasts depending upon financial and technical disclosure 
The information content of analyst forecasts in the announcement period is disentangled depending upon the timing of the forecast release date relative to periodic financial 
disclosure only (Panel A), periodic financial disclosure, timely technical disclosure and no disclosure both in the non-complements framework (Panel B) and in the complements 
framework (Panel C). We identify the non-complements framework when earnings-forecast revisions are preceded either by i) timely technical disclosure only, or by ii) periodic 
financial disclosure only, whereas we identify the complements framework when earnings-forecast revisions are preceded either by iii) timely technical disclosure or timely 
technical disclosure in conjunction with periodic financial disclosure, or by iv) periodic financial disclosure or periodic financial disclosure in conjunction with timely technical 
disclosure. In the fixed-effects panel-data technique used, the dependent variable is the (annual and quarterly) earnings forecast revision for analyst y at the forecast-release date t. 
The explanatory variables are: (1) RRPyt, the cumulative returns for Intel in the revision period, (2) RMRPyt, the cumulative returns on the market portfolio (Nasdaq Composite 
Index) in the revision period, (3) RAPyt*D1, where RAPyt is the cumulative returns for Intel in the announcement period and D1 is a dummy variable equal to one if periodic 
financial disclosure occurred in the last four days of the forecast-revision period, zero otherwise; (4) RAPyt*D2, where D2  is a dummy variable equal to one if timely technical 
disclosure occurred in between the last two weeks and last five days of the forecast-revision period, zero otherwise, (5) RAPyt*D3, where D3 is a dummy variable equal to one if no 
disclosure occurred in the forecast-revision period, zero otherwise (in Panel A, this variable indicates absence of periodic financial disclosure whereas in Panel C by definition this 
variable does not exist), (6) RMAPyt*D1, the cumulative returns on the market portfolio (Nasdaq Composite Index) in the announcement period;  (7) RMAPyt*D2, (8) RMAPyt*D3. 
The coefficients of RAPyt*D1 (γ31), RAPyt*D2 (γ32) and RAPyt*D3 (γ33) indicate the information content in the announcement period depending upon periodic financial disclosure, 
timely technical disclosure and no disclosure (in Panel A, this variable indicates absence of periodic financial disclosure whereas in Panel C by definition this variable does not 
exist). The test refers to Intel over the period July 2004-December 2007. *, **, *** indicate two-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05 and <0.01 respectively. 
Panel A: PERIODIC FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE ONLY 




















F Adj R2 
[N. obs] 
Predicted sign  + - + n.a. + - n.a. -   
Disclosure type    Financial only  No disclosure  Financial only  No disclosure     
Coefficient 0.013*** 0.218*** 0.199*** 0.807*** 1.100*** -1.001*** -2.223*** Yes 80.837*** 12.41% 
Std. Error 0.003 0.028 0.038 0.073 0.138 0.190 0.313  [3827] 
t-statistic 4.044 7.764 5.260 11.083 7.979 -5.312 -7.112   
Panel B: PERIODIC FINANCIAL AND TIMELY TECHNICAL DISCLOSURE  - NON-COMPLEMENTS 




















F Adj R2 
[N. obs] 
Predicted sign  + - + - 0 - - 0   
Disclosure type    Financial only Technical only No disclosure Financial only Technical only No disclosure    
Coefficient 0.022*** 0.645*** -0.289*** 0.769*** -1.326* 1.082*** 5.538*** 1.114 -2.746*** Yes 42.93*** 21.53% 
Std. Error 0.005 0.051 0.095 0.212 0.749 0.131 1.168 1.265 0.553  [1503] 
t-statistic 4.78 12.57 -3.03 3.62 -1.77 8.24 4.74 0.88 -4.97   
Panel C: PERIODIC FINANCIAL AND TIMELY TECHNICAL DISCLOSURE – COMPLEMENTS 




















F Adj R2 
[N. obs] 






















No disclosure    
Coefficient 0.020*** 0.625*** -0.217** 0.760*** 0.452* - 1.433* -4.052*** - Yes 54.86*** 20.77% 
Std. Error 0.005 0.051 0.094 0.205 0.243 0.879 0.894  [1503] 
t-statistic 4.37 12.29 -2.31 3.72 1.86 1.64 -4.53   
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Table 6 
Financial and technical disclosure and analyst earnings-forecast revisions: 
major vs. other brokerage and investment firms  
A comparison of the earnings-forecast revisions provided by analysts employed by major brokerage and 
investment firms (Panel A), and by those employed by other firms (Panel B). Earnings-forecast revisions 
are preceded either by i) timely technical disclosure only, or by ii) periodic financial disclosure only (non-
complements), or by iii) timely technical disclosure or timely technical disclosure in conjunction with 
periodic financial disclosure, or by iv) periodic financial disclosure or periodic financial disclosure in 
conjunction with timely technical disclosure (complements). Highly-relevant technical disclosure dates 
are identified by the researchers from the full set of Intel’s press releases for the period (where the 
definition of high-relevance was in terms of their anticipated effect on issues such as overall market 
creation, breakthrough technology innovation affecting production processes, and technology innovation 
affecting product design and, therefore, capability for the industry as a whole). Periodic financial 
disclosure dates are taken from Compustat and SEC. The brokerage and investment firm hierarchy is 
derived from a ranking published by Institutional Investor. The comparison refers to Intel over the period 
July 2004-December 2007.  
 
PANEL A: Major brokerage and investment firms 
 NON-COMPLEMENTS COMPLEMENTS 




ii) Revisions with 
periodic financial 
disclosure only 
iii) Revisions with 
timely highly-relevant 
technical disclosure (or 
with technical and 
financial disclosures) 
iv) Revisions with 
periodic financial 
disclosure (or with 
financial and  
technical disclosures) 
 FEPS FEPS FEPS FEPS 
Mean 0.011 0.058 0.005 0.028 
Std. Error 0.164 0.203 0.164 0.185 
Min -0.267 -0.609 -0.475 -0.609 
Median 0.007 0.026 0.017 0.026 
Max 0.960 0.545 1.078 1.078 
Number of revisions 88 146 253 311 
Number of analysts 12 18 18 18 
Number of revisions 
per analyst 
7.33 8.11 14.06 17.28 
Number of brokerage 
and investment firms 
10 11 11 11 
PANEL B: Other brokerage and investment firms 
 NON-COMPLEMENTS COMPLEMENTS 




ii) Revisions with 
periodic financial 
disclosure only 
iii) Revisions with 
timely highly-relevant 
technical disclosure (or 
with technical and 
financial disclosures) 
iv) Revisions with 
periodic financial 
disclosure (or with 
financial and  
technical disclosures) 
 FEPS FEPS FEPS FEPS 
Mean -0.009 0.025 0.017 0.026 
Std. Error 0.142 0.193 0.166 0.182 
Min -0.535 -0.783 -0.535 -0.783 
Median 0.000 0.026 0.017 0.026 
Max 0.419 0.500 1.173 1.173 
Number of revisions 165 357 592 784 
Number of analysts 40 47 55 52 
Number of revisions 
per analyst 
4.12 7.60 10.76 15.08 
Number of brokerage 
and investment firms 
37 42 48 47 
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Table 7 
Information content of analyst forecasts depending upon financial and technical disclosure:  
major vs. other brokerage and investment firms 
The information content of analyst forecasts in the announcement period for analysts employed at major brokerage and investment firms, and for those employed at other firms. 
The information content is disentangled depending upon the timing of the forecast release date relative to periodic financial disclosure, timely technical disclosure and no 
disclosure both in the non-complements framework (Panel A) and in the complements framework (Panel B). We identify the non-complement framework when earnings-
forecast revisions are preceded either by i) timely technical disclosure only, or by ii) periodic financial disclosure only, whereas we identify the complements framework when 
earnings-forecast revisions are preceded either by iii) timely technical disclosure or timely technical disclosure in conjunction with periodic financial disclosure, or by iv) 
periodic financial disclosure or periodic financial disclosure in conjunction with timely technical disclosure. In the fixed-effects panel-data technique used, the dependent 
variable is the (annual and quarterly) earnings forecast revision for analyst y at the forecast-release date t. The explanatory variables are: (1) RRPyt, the cumulative returns for 
Intel in the revision period, (2) RMRPyt, the cumulative returns on the market portfolio (Nasdaq Composite Index) in the revision period, (3) RAPyt*D1, where RAPyt is the 
cumulative returns for Intel in the announcement period and D1 is a dummy variable equal to one if periodic financial disclosure occurred in the last four days of the forecast-
revision period, zero otherwise; (4) RAPyt*D2, where D2  is a dummy variable equal to one if timely technical disclosure occurred in between the last two weeks and last five days 
of the forecast-revision period, zero otherwise, (5) RAPyt*D3, where D3 is a dummy variable equal to one if no disclosure occurred in the forecast-revision period, zero otherwise 
(in Panel B by definition this variable does not exist), (6) RMAPyt*D1, the cumulative returns on the market portfolio (Nasdaq Composite Index) in the announcement period;  (7) 
RMAPyt*D2, (8) RMAPyt*D3. The coefficients of RAPyt*D1 (γ31), RAPyt*D2 (γ32) and RAPyt*D3 (γ33) indicate the information content in the announcement period depending upon 
periodic financial disclosure, timely technical disclosure and no disclosure. The brokerage and investment firm hierarchy is derived from a ranking published by Institutional 
Investor. The test refers to Intel in each year over July 2004-December 2007. *. **, *** indicate two-tailed p-values <0.10, <0.05 and <0.01 respectively. 
Panel A: PERIODIC FINANCIAL AND TIMELY TECHNICAL DISCLOSURE - NON-COMPLEMENTS 






















Predicted sign  + - + - 0 - - 0   
Disclosure type    Financial only Technical only No disclosure Financial only Technical only No disclosure    
Coefficient 0.019** 0.515*** 0.268 0.214 -1.376 1.348*** 5.035** 2.140 -1.985** Yes 17.06*** 31.20% 







t-statistic 2.40 5.23 1.54 0.58 -1.31 6.09 2.12 0.93 -1.94   
Coefficient 0.022*** 0.692*** -0.519*** 0.989*** -1.211 0.937*** 5.642*** 0.734 -3.037*** Yes 28.97*** 20.91% 







t-statistic 4.00 11.50 -4.56 3.83 -1.14 5.77 4.21 0.48 -4.64   
Panel B: PERIODIC FINANCIAL AND TIMELY TECHNICAL DISCLOSURE – COMPLEMENTS 


















F Adj R2 
[N.obs] 






















No disclosure    
Coefficient 0.018** 0.519*** 0.282 0.440 1.105*** 0.991 -3.293** Yes 21.73*** 30.57% 







t-statistic 2.20 5.39 1.56 1.25 2.62 0.59 -1.96   
Coefficient 0.020*** 0.668*** -0.426*** 0.882*** -0.185 1.151 -4.276*** Yes 36.45*** 19.46% 











The effect of analyst information processing on analyst forecast accuracy 
The effect of analyst information processing on accuracy is investigated both in the non-complements framework (Panel A), and in the complements framework (Panel B). We 
identify the non-complements framework when earnings-forecast revisions are preceded either by i) timely technical disclosure only, or by ii) periodic financial disclosure 
only, whereas we identify the complements framework when earnings-forecast revisions are preceded either by iii) timely technical disclosure or timely technical disclosure in 
conjunction with periodic financial disclosure, or by iv) periodic financial disclosure or periodic financial disclosure in conjunction with timely technical disclosure. In the 
fixed-effects panel-data technique used, the dependent variable is the forecast accuracy for analyst y in quarter t. The explanatory variables are: (1) D1 is a dummy variable 
equal to one if analyst y reacts in quarter t at least to one periodic financial disclosure, zero otherwise, (2) D2 is a dummy variable equal to one if analyst y reacts in quarter t at 
least to one timely technical disclosure, zero otherwise, (3) Speed1 is the average number of days analyst y employs in quarter t to react to periodic financial disclosure, (4) 
Speed2 is the average number of days analyst y employs in quarter t to react to timely technical disclosure, (5) Intensity1 is the number of periodic financial disclosures that 
analyst y employs in quarter t, (6) Intensity2 is the number of timely technical disclosures that analyst y employs in quarter t, (7) Experience is the ln of the number of previous 
quarters analyst y issued a forecast at quarter t. The test refers to Intel over the period July 2004-December 2007. **, *** indicate two-tailed p-values <0.05 and <0.01 
respectively.  


























Predicted sign  - - - - - - +/- -   
Disclosure type 
 
 Financial only 
 
Technical only Financial only Technical only 
 
Financial only Technical only 
 
 Technical only 
 
   
Coefficient 0.002*** -0.001* -0.001 0.001 -0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001***  Yes 9.66*** 14.72% 









t-statistic 5.83 -1.69 -1.36 0.08 -2.36 2.05 1.95 2.67   
Coefficient 0.002*** -0.001* -0.001 0.001 -0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 Yes 8.52*** 14.77% 









t-statistic 6.11 -1.70 -1.58 0.08 -2.34 2.02 1.92 2.05 0.56   






















F Adj R2 
[N. obs] 

























   
Coefficient 0.001*** -0.001 0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** 0.001** -0.001* 0.001*** Yes 11.56*** 12.50% 









t-statistic 2.61 -0.19 5.36 -1.99 -1.93 2.43 -1.66 3.62   
Coefficient 0.001*** 0.001 0.002*** -0.001** -0.001* 0.001** -0.001** 0.001 0.001* Yes 10.49*** 12.80% 









t-statistic 3.08 0.03 5.38 -1.98 -1.71 2.29 -2.25 1.36 1.65   
 
